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Abstract. In this paper we show that a standard economic model, the endogenous
learning-by-doing model, captures several major themes from the anxiety literature
in psychology. In our model, anxiety is a fully endogenous construct which can
be separated naturally into its cognitive and physiological components. As such,
our results are directly comparable with hypotheses and evidence from psychology.
We show that anxiety can serve a motivating function, which suggests potential
applications in the principal-agent literature.It doesn’t take much technique to roll a 1.68 inch ball along a smooth, level
surface into, or in the immediate vicinity of, a 4.5 inch hole. With no pressure on
you, you can do it one-handed most of the time. But there is always pressure on the
shorter putts... 90 percent of the rounds I play in major championships, I play with
a bit of a shake.
Jack Nicklaus, quoted in Patmore (1986, p. 75).
1. Introduction
Economic decision-making often involves considerable anxiety. Despite this, anxiety
research in economics has been fairly limited, with recent pioneering contributions
by Loewenstein (1987) and Caplin and Leahy (2001). In contrast, psychologists have
amassed a substantial theoretical and empirical literature analyzing the eﬀects of
anxiety on “performance”, where the latter may refer to reaction times, informa-
tion processing, athletic performance, and diverse other activities. For economists
interested in incorporating the eﬀects of anxiety into formal economic models, the
problem is that most of these psychological “theories” are really non-deductive the-
oretical “frameworks” which seem diﬃcult to formalize in terms of explicit utility
maximization.
The literature on endogenous learning-by-doing (ELBD) or “experimentation”
includes Prescott (1972), Grossman, Kihlstrom, and Mirman (1977), Fusselman and
Mirman (1993), and Mirman, Samuelson, and Urbano (1993), among others. In this
paper, we use a simpliﬁed version of the ELBD model in Rauh and Seccia (2003)
to investigate the relationship between anxiety and performance. Speciﬁcally, we
consider the decision problem of an agent performing a task which extends over two
periods, where performance depends on skill, eﬀort, and a stochastic productivity
shock. At the start of the ﬁrst period, the agent is uncertain about her skill level,
and we deﬁne anxiety as the agent’s subjective evaluation of the residual uncertainty
corresponding to the second period, valued in terms of expected utility. Hence,
anxiety is an anticipatory emotion as in Caplin and Leahy. At the start of the
second period, the agent observes her ﬁrst period performance and updates her
1prior belief about her skill. So eﬀort plays two distinct roles in this model: it
increases performance directly, but it also impacts on anxiety by inﬂuencing the
informativeness of the signal.
We show that the ELBD model captures several major themes from the theo-
retical and empirical psychology literature. E.g., in our model anxiety can serve a
motivating function: increases in anxiety can motivate the agent to increase eﬀort,
thereby improving expected performance. This is also a cornerstone of the process-
ing eﬃciency theory in cognitive psychology. Furthermore, under certain conditions
eﬀort and expected performance at the optimum are hill-shaped in anxiety-related
parameters, which is known as the inverted-U hypothesis or Yerkes-Dodson Law in
psychology.
Similarly, Caplin and Leahy consider a two-period model where anxiety is con-
ceptualized as a psychological state depending on the ﬁrst period outcome and the
unresolved uncertainty corresponding to the second period. As in our model, the
agent chooses the ﬁrst period action with an eye towards the ﬁrst period outcome,
as well as anxiety about the second period. The main element in their psychological
expected utility theory (PEUT) is an exogenous map φ which assigns a psychological
state to the current outcome and expected second period lottery.
The PEUT oﬀers several advantages over our model. It is substantively far
more general and can accomodate the full range of anticipatory emotions, not just
anxiety. It is also highly amenable for applications, which Caplin and Leahy demon-
strate in the context of portfolio choice and the equity premium puzzle. However,
anxiety remains a “black box” in their theory and the map φ has little structure
apart from continuity, making comparisons with the psychology literature diﬃcult.
This is problematic, since many applications require some speciﬁcation for φ, as il-
lustrated by their asset pricing example, and the PEUT provides little guidance on
this. In contrast, anxiety is a fully endogenous construct in the ELBD model since
the information processing aspect is well-articulated. Furthermore, we show that
our anxiety concept can be naturally separated into its cognitive and physiological
2components, making our results directly comparable with the theoretical and em-
pirical psychology literature. One can therefore view the paper as an attempt to
put some empirically testable structure on φ.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we brieﬂy survey the
relevant psychology literature. In section 3 we develop the model and in sections 4
and 5 present our comparative statics results. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Psychology Literature on Anxiety and Performance
In this section, we brieﬂy survey some of the hypotheses, theories, and evidence
on the anxiety-performance relationship in the psychology literature. This survey
is far from exhaustive, not only for reasons of space, but also because much of
the psychology literature is essentially non-economic in nature.1 This section is
heavily indebted to the highly readable surveys by Woodman and Hardy (2001)
and Zaichkowsky and Baltzell (2001).
We begin by deﬁning terms, essentially conforming to the deﬁnitions in Wood-
man and Hardy.2
Anxiety is generally accepted as being an unpleasant emotion... Researchers in
mainstream psychology have suggested that anxiety might have at least two distin-
guishable components: a mental component normally termed cognitive anxiety or
worry, and a physiological component normally termed somatic anxiety or physiolog-
ical arousal.
Woodman and Hardy, p. 290-291.
In this paper, arousal is distinguished by its signiﬁcant (although not exclusive)
physiological component, and often subconscious nature: “indications of autonomic
arousal and unpleasant feeling states such as nervousness and tension” [Morris,
1 E.g., the theory of ironic processes of mental control is based on the observation that if one
consciously attempts to not think of a white bear, it becomes diﬃcult not to. In general, this
theory posits the existence of a monitoring process which identiﬁes and highlights actions with
negative consequences. Normally, this focuses the agent to avoid such actions, but when the agent
is under pressure, this focus becomes excessive, causing them to be carried out. In other words,
the agent says to herself “whatever you do, don’t do x” and then she does x. Although interesting,
this theory has little relevance for the model in this paper.
2 All quotations in this paper are exact, except for terms in square brackets [...].
3Davis, and Hutchings (1981, p. 541)]. High arousal may lead to an elevated heart
rate, shaky hands, and other physical symptoms, some of which can be objectively
measured, although psychologists also use self-report scales.3 Arousal also contains
a psychological component. E.g., Janelle, Singer, and Williams (1999) found that
anxious subjects often focus on irrelevant internal and external information. Since
this may have a signiﬁcant subconscious aspect, we include such eﬀects in our
conceptualization of arousal. The second component of anxiety, cognitive anxiety, is
a mental component synonymous with worry: “negative expectations and cognitive
concerns about oneself, the situation at hand, and potential consequences” (Morris
et al., p. 541). It is distinguished from arousal by being a largely conscious mental
state associated with information processing.
Inverted-U Hypothesis
The inverted-U hypothesis, often taught in introductory psychology courses, states
that performance is hill-shaped in anxiety or one of its components. Hence, increases
in anxiety improve performance when anxiety is low, but impair performance when
anxiety is high. (A stronger version requires a symmetric or even quadratic relation-
ship.) Although numerous studies support the inverted-U hypothesis, the empirical
evidence is mixed. See Zaichkowsky and Baltzell (p. 326-328) for a survey. As
a hypothesis about the relationship between performance and anxiety, it has been
criticized for conceptualizing the latter as a one-dimensional construct, as opposed
to consisting of diﬀerent components. Like the IZOF and cusp catastrophe models
discussed below, it does not explain the anxiety-performance relationship. Finally,
it fails to take account of individual diﬀerences across agents.
3 One may also distinguish between objective physiological arousal and its perception (the latter
is sometimes called somatic anxiety), but we do not make that distinction here.
4Individualized Zones of Optimal Functioning (IZOF)
The IZOF model was developed by Yuri Hanin from data collected on elite Soviet
athletes. It is similar to the inverted-U hypothesis, except that the optimal level
of anxiety is a zone, rather than a singleton; i.e., the relationship is plateau- rather
than hill-shaped. The goal of the applied psychologist is to ﬁnd this zone through
repeated observation and help the agent attain it (“get in the zone”). The criticisms
of the IZOF model are similar to those of the inverted-U hypothesis:
More seriously, Hanin’s IZOFs constitute what is essentially an individual dif-
ference “theory” without any individual diﬀerence variables... Consequently, despite
some encouraging applied data, IZOF remains an intuitive applied tool that, as yet,
has little theoretical value.
Woodman and Hardy, p. 295.
Cusp Catastrophe Model
Fazey and Hardy (1988) model the anxiety-performance relationship as a standard
cusp catastrophe. As in this paper, they conceptualize anxiety as consisting of
two components: arousal and cognitive anxiety. When cognitive anxiety is low,
the relationship between performance and arousal is an inverted-U. When cognitive
anxiety is high, however, a discontinuity develops exhibiting hysteresis. At ﬁrst,
increases in arousal improve performance, but at some point a small increase in
arousal leads to a disproportionately large drop in performance (catastrophe), after
which performance is decreasing in arousal. A large reduction in arousal is necessary
to re-attain the high, pre-catastrophe level of performance (hysteresis). Along the
other axis, increases in cognitive anxiety improve performance when arousal is low,
but impair it when arousal is high. Once again, the cusp catastrophe model is not
a theory, but a mathematically precise hypothesis. Woodman and Hardy (p. 298)
discuss several recent empirical studies supporting some of the predictions of the
cusp catastrophe model, including the inverted-U relationship between performance
and arousal when cognitive anxiety is low and hysteresis when it is high.
5We now turn to theories which purport to explain the anxiety-performance
relationship. Note that all of the “theories” surveyed below are not really theories
in the deductive sense, but rather non-deductive theoretical “frameworks”.
The Processing Eﬃciency Theory
The empirical psychology literature on the anxiety-performance relationship is quite
rich, with numerous contrary ﬁndings. Eysenck and Calvo (1992) developed the
processing eﬃciency theory to address these varied results and, in particular, to
explain how anxiety could improve performance.
One is concerned with the explanation of the relationship between anxiety and
performance, taking into account not only the data regarding the negative eﬀects of
anxiety, but also trying to reconcile them with those ﬁndings indicating a lack of
eﬀect (or even a positive one).
Eysenck and Calvo, p. 410.
After citing some evidence suggesting a minor role for arousal, Eysenck and Calvo
focus exclusively on cognitive anxiety. As in most anxiety theories, the processing
eﬃciency theory posits that anxiety induces worry, which creates “cognitive interfer-
ence” by using up scarce attentional resources. This reduces processing eﬃciency,
deﬁned as the speed and ease with which information is processed, leading to a
reduction in performance. The direct eﬀect of anxiety is therefore always negative.
Unlike most anxiety theories, however, the agent can take certain actions to miti-
gate its adverse eﬀects. In particular, Eysenck and Calvo stress that anxiety also
serves a motivational function, inducing the agent to consider measures to avoid the
adverse consequences of poor performance. In particular, the agent may increase
eﬀort, provided the probability of success is perceived to be suﬃciently high. Hence,
although anxiety may be an unpleasant state which reduces processing eﬃciency, it
can increase performance by inducing greater eﬀort. If, however, the probability of
success is perceived to be low, the agent may decrease eﬀort, reducing performance
still further. Woodman and Hardy (p. 308) survey supporting evidence, includ-
6ing support for the prediction that an increase in cognitive anxiety can lead to an
increase in eﬀort and performance.
One is immediately struck by the essentially economic nature of this theory,
where the choice of eﬀort involves an explicit cost-beneﬁt calculation based on the
probability of success. Indeed, the ELBD model in this paper will closely parallel
the processing eﬃciency theory in several respects.
Reversal Theory
Another theory which might explain some of the divergent empirical ﬁndings is
Apter’s reversal theory. Reversal theory emphasizes the dynamic and inconsistent
aspects of human nature, positing that agents can suddenly switch between “meta-
motivational” states.
In a telic state (i.e., a state in which individuals are goal-oriented and express
purpose), individuals tend to be fairly serious, with a preference for low arousal. Con-
versely, in a paratelic state (i.e., a state in which individuals are oriented toward the
sensations associated with their behavior), individuals tend to be fairly spontaneous,
with a preference for high arousal... Reversal theory further posits that performers
can rapidly change (reverse) from one metamotivational state to another.
Woodman and Hardy, p. 300.
Presumably, increases in anxiety would reduce performance in a telic state, and
improve it in a paratelic state. However,
There does not appear to be an obvious theoretical reason for proposing that
pleasant feelings about one’s level of physiological arousal should lead to better per-
formance... Although the notion of reversals is interesting, reversal theory has been
limited by its lack of theory in relation to performance... As such, reversal theory




Woodman and Hardy close their survey with the following questions (among others):
• How do cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal (or somatic anxiety) exert their
inﬂuence on performance (or performance-related variables)?
• What role, if any, does eﬀort play in delaying drops in performance or in curtailing
the magnitude of such decrements?
• Does eﬀort moderate the eﬀects of cognitive anxiety on performance?
• What personality and individual variables inﬂuence IZOFs?
ibid, p. 312.
To the above list, we would add the following:
• What is the relationship between performance and the components of anxiety?
Inverted-U, IZOF, or cusp catastrophe? In particular, why does anxiety sometimes
enhance performance, and other times inhibit it?
• What conditions encourage peak performance?
• Why and how do reversals occur, and what is the relationship with performance?
In this paper, we show that the ELBD model can be used to eﬀectively address
these issues.
3. The Model
The agents who usually populate economic models have little doubt about “who
they are”: they know their own abilities and basic preferences... Psychology, by con-
trast, gives a central role to the process of learning about oneself and to individuals’
struggle with their own identity...
B´ enabou and Tirole (2002)
We consider the decision problem of an agent engaged in a task which extends over
two periods, t = 1,2. Her performance in period t is given by
πt = θet + t, (1)
8where θ is talent or skill, et is period t eﬀort, and t is an unobservable productivity
shock. At the start of the ﬁrst period, the agent is uncertain about the value of
θ, either because the task itself is unfamiliar to some degree, or because ability
can vary across repetitions of the task due to changes in environmental conditions
and/or the agent’s physical or mental state. This self-doubt will be the source of
the agent’s anxiety in our model. The parameter R ≡ θH −θL indicates the level of
cognitive anxiety because it measures the agent’s “cognitive concerns about oneself”
as discussed in the previous section. Although θ is uncertain, its value is ﬁxed from
the outset. A priori, the agent believes θ is either high θH or low θL with equal
probability, where 0 < θL < θH. Let ¯ θ = (1/2)(θH + θL), ex ante expected skill.
Throughout the paper, we assume ¯ θ < 2/R for reasons which will become clear.
Recall that arousal is largely physiological and subconscious in nature, produc-
ing such eﬀects as shaky hands as in the introductory quote. In addition to actual
physical trembles, arousal may also produce mental “trembles” in decision-making
arising from a subconscious focus on irrelevant internal and external information.
Due to its subconscious nature, arousal enters the model through the stochastic pro-
ductivity shock and we posit that an increase in arousal increases the volatility of
such trembles. (Indeed, in section 5 below we assume t has a quadratic density and
arousal is parameterized by its curvature.) Arousal is therefore exogenous, which
seems reasonable in the short-run, although over time the agent may learn to better
control its eﬀects. Furthermore, there may be a deeper underlying process jointly
determining arousal and cognitive anxiety, making them correlated to some degree,
although we neglect this by modeling them as separate exogenous parameters. In
particular, nothing precludes a psychological state in which cognitive anxiety is high
but arousal is low (“cool under pressure”). Note that the productivity shock may
also incorporate external factors such as the eﬀects of the weather or the actions of
other agents. For the purposes of this section, we make the following assumptions.
Assumptions 1. (i) t is i.i.d. across periods and uncorrelated with θ. (ii) The
9cumulative distribution function F for t is representable by a continuous probability
density function f with support [−1,1]. (iii) f is positive on (−1,1) and symmetric
about 0. The latter implies t has mean zero.
In this section, we distinguish between two diﬀerent types of f. Type 1 densities
correspond to low arousal. They are roughly hill-shaped and represent low volatility
situations where with high probability t takes values close to the mean, which is
zero. Type 2 densities correspond to high arousal. They are roughly U-shaped and
represent high volatility situations where with high probability t takes extreme
values in the tails, close to -1 or 1.
Deﬁnition 1. We say f is type 1 (type 2) if it is increasing (decreasing) on
[−1,0).4
At the start of the second period, the agent observes her ﬁrst period perfor-






where fH ≡ f(π1 − θHe1) and fL ≡ f(π1 − θLe1) are the conditional densities.
Hence, eﬀort plays two distinct roles in this model: it aﬀects performance directly
as in (1), but it also aﬀects the second period belief as in (2). The latter represents
the ELBD aspect of the model.
Let
L1 ≡ θLe1 − 1 L2 ≡ θLe1 + 1
H1 ≡ θHe1 − 1 H2 ≡ θHe1 + 1. (3)
An eﬀort level satisfying e1 < 2/R is called non-fully-revealing, since information
remains incomplete for signals π1 ∈ [H1,L2], where H1 < L2. Eﬀort levels satisfying
4 Throughout the paper, we use the terms “increasing” and “decreasing” in their strict senses.
10e1 ≥ 2/R are called fully-revealing, since the agent can fully infer θ for almost all
signals (i.e., with probability 1). We call 2/R the threshold level of eﬀort.5
The agent’s utility in period t is given by
ut = πt − (1/2)e2
t; (4)
performance minus the quadratic disutility of eﬀort. Although the agent suﬀers
from anxiety, she is “rational” in the usual sense that she chooses e1(θH,θL) and
e2(π1 |θH,θL) to maximize the prior expectation of u1 + u2.
We ﬁrst consider the second period problem. To make the model tractable, we
assume second period eﬀort is a binary choice variable. Speciﬁcally, the agent can
only choose between high eﬀort e2 = θH or low eﬀort e2 = θL.6 Let E(θ|I2) denote
the expectation of θ given the second period information set I2, which includes
{e1,π1}. The expected payoﬀ of choosing e2 = θi is therefore E(θ|I2)θi − (1/2)θ2
i,
where i = H,L. Assuming indiﬀerence is resolved in favor of high eﬀort, the agent
chooses e2 = θH iﬀ
E(θ|I2) ≥ ¯ θ ⇐⇒ ρ ≥ 1/2, (5)
where we have used the fact that
θH = ¯ θ + (R/2) and θL = ¯ θ − (R/2). (6)
Since
E(θ|I2) = ρR + ¯ θ − (R/2), (7)
the second period value function is




























5 The feasibility of full revelation is unimportant for our results. One could assume eﬀort is
constrained from above by some constant less than the threshold.
6 In the working paper version, available from the authors upon request, we allowed second
period eﬀort to be a continuous choice variable. The resulting model is substantially more compli-
cated than the one analyzed here, but simulations show that the results are qualitatively similar.
11where 1ρ≥1/2 is the indicator function which equals one when ρ ≥ 1/2 and zero
otherwise, and 1ρ<1/2 is deﬁned similarly.
In the ﬁrst period, the agent chooses e1 ≥ 0 to maximize
U(e1 | ¯ θ,R) = ¯ θe1 − (1/2)e2
1 + E(V2 |I1), (9)
where
E(V2 |I1) = (1/2)
Z H2
H1
V2 fH dπ1 + (1/2)
Z L2
L1
V2 fL dπ1 (10)
and I1 is the ﬁrst period information set. Proposition 1 below states that the
precise form of E(V2 |I1) depends on whether f is type 1 or 2. This is because type
1 and 2 densities represent diﬀerent informational environments, as explained in the
following lemma. When f is type 1, higher signals imply ρ ≥ 1/2, but when f is
type 2, this is not necessarily so.
Lemma. If 0 < e1 < 2/R, then on the interval [H1,L2]: (i) if f is type 1,
ρ ≥ 1/2 ⇐⇒ π1 ≥ ¯ θe1. (11)
(ii) If f is type 2,
ρ ≥ 1/2 ⇐⇒ π1 ≤ ¯ θe1. (12)
The proof of the following proposition involves a straightforward but lengthy
evaluation of the integral in (10), using the lemma (see the appendix).
Proposition 1. For 0 ≤ e1 ≤ 2/R, (i) if f is type 1,
E(V2 |I1) = (1/2)¯ θ2 − (3/8)R2 + (1/2)R2F(Re1/2). (13)
(ii) If f is type 2,
E(V2 |I1) = (1/2)¯ θ2 + (5/8)R2 − (1/2)R2 [F(Re1/2) + F(1 − Re1)]. (14)


















1 is optimal ﬁrst period eﬀort. To interpret this, note that ¯ θ is the myopic
optimum: the optimal solution when the agent is unconcerned about generating
information for the second period.7 Any deviation from e1 = ¯ θ will reduce expected
ﬁrst period utility. The expression in (15) is the expected second period beneﬁt
from choosing e∗
1 rather than ¯ θ. Since ﬁrst period eﬀort is a purely informational
variable in the second period, this expected beneﬁt represents the agent’s subjective
evaluation of the beneﬁt of improved information. The cost of information is the
reduction in expected ﬁrst period utility as a result of choosing e∗
1 rather than ¯ θ.
Since the second term in (15) is a constant, we could re-write the objective function
in (9) as
¯ θe1 − (1/2)e2
1 + the value of information. (16)
To motivate our anxiety construct, we recall that anxiety is generally regarded
as a “negative emotion” and is therefore associated with the economic concept of
utility. As Caplin and Leahy emphasize, anxiety is anticipatory in nature, and often
connected with future uncertainties. In our model, the agent anticipates the start
of the second period, when she may have to make a decision based on incomplete
information. The subjective evaluation of the residual uncertainty is given by
E
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We therefore deﬁne anxiety A(e1 |R) by the expression in (17).
Remarks
(i) Although cognitive anxiety appears explicitly in (17), arousal is only implicitly
represented by f. In particular, in this section we distinguish broadly between type
1 (low arousal) and type 2 (high arousal) densities. In section 5 below, arousal will
appear in (17) as an explicit parameter. (ii) Note that anxiety is zero when eﬀort
7 Note that if ¯ θ ≥ 2/R then e1 = ¯ θ is trivially optimal, since the myopic optimum is also
fully-revealing.
13is fully-revealing. Evidently, the agent is not anxious about the possibility that θ
could be low, only that there might be some residual uncertainty at the start of the
second period. Hence, in our model anxiety is connected with residual uncertainty,
not with the possibility of negative outcomes. Clearly, this is a limitation of our
theory. (iii) Finally, our deﬁnition of anxiety is founded in standard expected utility
theory. Although this may not be desirable in and of itself, it does mean that we
can draw on an established set of techniques to analyze the model.
Since the ﬁrst term in (17) is a constant, we can re-write (9) as
U(e1 | ¯ θ,R) = ¯ θe1 − (1/2)e2
1 − A(e1 |R). (18)
From now on, we take (18) to be the agent’s objective function. Proposition 2 is
immediate from proposition 1.
Proposition 2. For 0 ≤ e1 ≤ 2/R: (i) if f is type 1,





(ii) If f is type 2,
A(e1 |R) = (R2/2)

F(Re1/2) + F(1 − Re1) − 1

. (20)
4. Type 1 Comparative Statics with the MLRP
In this section, we derive some fairly general comparative statics results assuming
f is type 1 and satisﬁes the usual monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) (type
2 densities generally do not satisfy the MLRP).
Assumptions 2. (i) f is continuously diﬀerentiable on (−1,1). (ii) f0/f and
(1 − F)/f are decreasing on (0,1) (strict MLRP). (iii) lim→1 −f0()/f() > 3.
Proposition 3 below deals with the relationship between anxiety, eﬀort, and
cognitive anxiety. The ﬁrst part states that anxiety is decreasing in eﬀort, which
14is a fundamental assumption of the processing eﬃciency theory. The second part
states that anxiety is hill-shaped in cognitive anxiety: increases in R increase anxiety
when R is low, but reduce it when R is high. This is similar to reversal theory,
in which anxiety is sometimes interpreted negatively (telic state) and sometimes
positively (paratelic state). Recall that reversal theory stresses the inconsistent
aspect of human nature, and these diﬀering interpretations of anxiety occur because
of changes in the agent’s metamotivational state. In contrast, in our theory changes
in R are associated with changes in the informational content of the signal. The
intuition is given in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1 Goes Here
Figure 1 depicts the conditional densities fH and fL for a given level of eﬀort. The
diﬀerence between the conditional means is θHe1 − θLe1 = Re1. An increase in e1
or R would further separate the conditional densities, allowing the signal to better
discriminate between the two possible states. Hence, an increase in R has two
eﬀects: it increases the uncertainty associated with the second period, increasing
anxiety, but it also makes it easier for the signal to diﬀerentiate between the two
states, reducing anxiety. Looking back at (19), these two eﬀects are now clearly
evident: an increase in R holding x ≡ Re1/2 inside F constant increases anxiety,
but an increase in x holding R outside F ﬁxed reduces it.
Proposition 3. When eﬀort is non-fully-revealing: (i) anxiety is decreasing in
eﬀort. (ii) If x = Re1/2, there exists an ¯ x > 0 such that ∂A/∂R > 0 when
0 ≤ x < ¯ x, ∂A/∂R = 0 at x = ¯ x, and ∂A/∂R < 0 when ¯ x < x < 1.
We now turn to optimal eﬀort. The next proposition shows that anxiety mat-
ters, in the sense that the agent generally does not choose the myopic optimum, but
instead manipulates her eﬀort level to cope with anxiety. Since U is strictly concave
in eﬀort, the agent’s maximization problem has a unique solution e∗
1 characterized
15by the ﬁrst-order condition
∂U
∂e1




when it is interior. Since e1 = ¯ θ strictly dominates e1 = 0, the only other possible
solution is full revelation, e1 = 2/R. At an interior solution ∂A/∂e1 < 0 by proposi-
tion 3(i), so optimal eﬀort exceeds the myopic optimum. This is the classical ELBD
result: increasing eﬀort above the myopic optimum reduces expected ﬁrst period
utility, but increases overall utility by improving second period information.
The second part of Proposition 4 states that, assuming an interior solution, the
relationship between eﬀort and cognitive anxiety is hill-shaped; i.e., the inverted-U
hypothesis obtains. Furthermore, the possibility of increasing eﬀort in response to
an increase in cognitive anxiety is the distinguishing characteristic of the processing
eﬃciency theory:
Processing eﬃciency theory states that cognitive anxiety (a negative emotion)
can have a negative cognitive eﬀect... while serving a positive motivational function
(increased eﬀort).
Woodman and Hardy, p. 306.
In our model, increases in cognitive anxiety at ﬁrst increase anxiety, and the agent
is therefore motivated to increase eﬀort. Eventually, however, increases in cognitive
anxiety are informative, thereby reducing anxiety, so the agent reduces eﬀort to
save on the information cost.
Proposition 4. (i) If ¯ θ < 2/R then optimal eﬀort e∗
1 exceeds the myopic optimum.
(ii) Let x∗ ≡ Re∗
1/2. There exists a constant ¯ x > 0 such that the interior solution
satisﬁes ∂e∗
1/∂R > 0 when 0 < x∗ < ¯ x, ∂e∗
1/∂R = 0 at x∗ = ¯ x, and ∂e∗
1/∂R < 0
when ¯ x < x∗ < 1. A similar statement applies to expected ﬁrst period performance
at the optimum, since the latter is optimal eﬀort scaled by ¯ θ.
165. Quadratic Comparative Statics
In the previous section, we focused on the type 1 case only, and did not address the
relationship between eﬀort and arousal. Recall that in this paper we formalize the
eﬀects of arousal in terms of subconscious trembles in performance, both physical
and mental. We therefore measure the eﬀects of arousal by the volatility of . In
this section, we assume f belongs to a quadratic family of densities whose volatility
can be parameterized, allowing us to study the eﬀort-arousal relationship. This will









2(3+a) −1 ≤ t ≤ 1
0 otherwise,
(22)
where a ≥ −1. Note that ∂2f/∂2
t = 3a/(3 + a), which is increasing in a. When
a < 0, f is type 1 and satisﬁes the MLRP. As a increases, starting from −1, f is
transformed from a standard hill-shaped density into the uniform distribution at
a = 0. When a > 0, f is type 2 and increases in a make it progressively more
U-shaped. Hence, the parameter a determines the volatility of t and measures the
eﬀects of arousal. The cumulative distribution function of t is
F(t |a) =

   
   




2(3+a) −1 ≤ t ≤ 1
1 otherwise.
(23)
Straightforward substitution into proposition 2 yields



















17Now anxiety depends explicitly on both cognitive anxiety and arousal.
Proposition 6 states that when arousal is low, anxiety is decreasing in eﬀort
as before. But when arousal is high, anxiety becomes cubic in eﬀort as evident
from (25), where anxiety is increasing in eﬀort over some region. In contrast, the
processing eﬃciency theory assumes anxiety is always decreasing in eﬀort. The
intuition for the non-monotonicity of anxiety is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2 Goes Here
When a > 0, the conditional densities are U-shaped, so with high probability the
signal will occur in the tails of one of the conditional densities. The outer tails at
the extreme ends are already separated, so it can be more informative to reduce
eﬀort, pulling the conditional means closer together. This would further separate
the inner tails, making signals between the conditional means more informative.
Hence, a reduction in eﬀort can improve information.
Proposition 6. (anxiety and eﬀort) When eﬀort is non-fully-revealing: (i) anxiety
is decreasing in eﬀort when −1 ≤ a < 7/2 and nonincreasing when a = 7/2. (ii) If
a > 7/2, there exists 0 < y1 < y2 < 2 such that anxiety is decreasing in eﬀort when
y ≡ Re1 < y1, increasing when y1 < y < y2, and decreasing when y2 < y < 2.
The statements of the next two propositions are somewhat involved, and are
illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3 Goes Here
Panel A depicts the relationship between anxiety, cognitive anxiety, and arousal
when e1 = 1. Panels B and C depict cross-sections in arousal when R is 1.2 and
1.8, respectively. Recall that in the processing eﬃciency theory (as well as most
anxiety theories in psychology), anxiety is assumed to create “cognitive interference”
by using up scarce attentional resources. In our model, when a < 0 increases in
arousal increase anxiety by interfering with Bayesian inference. This is evident from
18Figure 1, where an increase in a would ﬂatten the conditional densities, reducing
the region of fully-revealing signals. In B, anxiety is hill-shaped in arousal, albeit
with a sharp (non-diﬀerentiable) peak. Our model therefore continues to exhibit
the telic/paratelic distinction of reversal theory, where increases in the components
of anxiety are sometimes viewed positively, sometimes negatively. More formally,
Proposition 7. (anxiety and arousal) When 0 < e1 < 2/R: (i) if −1 ≤ a < 0,
anxiety is increasing in arousal. (ii) If a > 0, anxiety is decreasing in arousal when
0 < Re1 ≡ y < 10/7 as in panel B and increasing when 10/7 < y < 2 as in C.
Panels D and E depict the relationship between anxiety and cognitive anxiety
when a = −1 and 200, respectively. In D, the relationship is hill-shaped as in the
previous section but in E there is an initial small hill-shape joined to a second, more
prominent one.
Proposition 8. (anxiety and cognitive anxiety) When eﬀort is non-fully-revealing,
there exists ¯ a > 0 such that (i) anxiety is hill-shaped in cognitive anxiety for all
−1 ≤ a < ¯ a. (ii) For a > ¯ a, there exists 0 < ¯ y < 2 such that anxiety is hill-shaped
in cognitive anxiety on [0, ¯ y] and on [¯ y,2].8
We use the following passage to summarize our anxiety construct.
[Anxiety] should be viewed as a multidimensional construct that contains a phys-
iological arousal component and a cognitive interpretation-appraisal component. Fur-
thermore the cognitive interpretation-appraisal component consists of a cognitive ap-
praisal of one’s physiological arousal..., negative aﬀect associated with one’s cognitive
appraisal of increased arousal..., and positive aﬀect associated with one’s cognitive
appraisal of increased arousal (paratelic state of excitement).
Gould and Udry (1994, p. 479).
In the psychology literature, the terms “component” and “multidimensional con-
struct” are used informally. In our theory, anxiety is literally a function of two
parameters which measure the agent’s cognitive anxiety (self-doubt) and arousal.
8 More precisely, if a > ¯ a and y ≡ Re1, there exists 0 < y1 < ¯ y < y2 < 2 such that ∂A/∂R > 0
for 0 ≤ y < y1 and ¯ y < y < y2 and ∂A/∂R < 0 for y1 < y < ¯ y and y2 < y < 2.
19This function contains an objective cognitive component (Bayesian updating), as
well as a subjective appraisal component (utility), and therefore corresponds to the
“cognitive interpretation-appraisal component” in the above passage. The agent is
fully cognizant of the parameters R and a and the roles they play in information
processing, and will choose her eﬀort level accordingly. This resembles the “cog-
nitive appraisal of one’s physiological arousal” requirement. Finally, in our theory
increases in arousal and cognitive anxiety can either increase or decrease anxiety,
corresponding to negative and positive “aﬀect”, respectively.
We now turn to optimal eﬀort. The proof of the following proposition is routine
and therefore omitted. When −1 ≤ a ≤ 0 the objective function is strictly concave
on [0,2/R], so optimal eﬀort is the local maximizer given in (26) and (27), provided
it is available on [0,2/R]. When a > 0, however, U can assume a cubic form with
a local maximum followed by a local minimum. The interior maximizer is given by
(28) and (29) below, which must be compared with the threshold to ﬁnd the global
maximizer.












N(¯ θ,R,a) = 1024(3 + a)2 − 48aR5[8¯ θ(3 + a) + 3R3], (27)
provided local
a≤0 ≤ 2/R. Otherwise, the threshold is the unique optimum. (ii) If












P(¯ θ,R,a) = 64(3 + a)2 + 24aR4(3 + a)(8 − 7¯ θR) + 9aR8(2a − 7). (29)
20In that case, the global maximizer is either the expression in (28) and (29) or the
threshold.
We illustrate the above proposition in Figure 4.
Figure 4 Goes Here
Panel A depicts the 3-dimensional relationship between optimal eﬀort, arousal,
and cognitive anxiety when ¯ θ = 1. In B-E we plot cross-sections in arousal for
successively higher values of R and in F-H cross-sections in R for successively higher
values of a.9 Recall that Figure 4 also depicts the qualitative behavior of expected
ﬁrst period performance at the optimum.
We ﬁrst note the variety of anxiety-performance relationships in Figure 4.
Given the rich empirical record discussed in section 2, we view this as a strength of
our theory.
The [processing eﬃciency] theory emerged from Eysenck’s dissatisfaction with
theorists’ simplistic conceptualization of anxiety-performance relationships... most
anxiety theories are based on anxiety-induced cognitive interference, such that anxiety
uses up attentional resources. These theories typically predict that high-anxious
individuals will perform less well than low-anxious individuals...
Woodman and Hardy, p. 306.
Indeed, Figure 4 displays several major themes from the theoretical and empirical
psychology literature. The monotonically decreasing relationship predicted in the
last sentence of the previous quote is depicted in panel C. In D,F, and G we have
roughly the inverted-U hypothesis, and in E the IZOF model, where the set of
maximizers is a zone rather than a singleton. The explanation for this array of
anxiety-performance relationships is that changes in the components of anxiety can
have several diﬀerent eﬀects. The main eﬀect of an increase in cognitive anxiety
when the latter is low is to increase the uncertainty associated with the second period
which can serve a motivating function as in panels F and G. However, increases in
9 In Panels B-E R equals 0.4, 0.6, 1.3, and 1.34, respectively, and in F-H a equals −1, 1, and
5, respectively.
21cognitive anxiety when the latter is high can also improve the informativeness of
the signal, causing the agent to reduce eﬀort to conserve on information costs, or
because lower eﬀort is more informative, as we saw in section 4. Similarly, increases
in arousal can create “cognitive interference” which can also serve a motivating
function as in D and E, but it can also improve the informativeness of the signal.
The variety of anxiety-performance relationships therefore reﬂects the variety of
relationships between anxiety and its components.
An advantage of our formal approach is that the ELBD model distinguishes
between these competing hypotheses. Take, for example, the inverted-U and IZOF
hypotheses: the latter obtains when ex ante expected skill and/or cognitive anxiety
are relatively high. Indeed, the diﬀerence between D and E is that R is higher in the
latter. The myopic optimum and the threshold are closer, making the information
cost of full revelation smaller. To see the diﬀerence, we return to panels 3F and
3G which depict anxiety evaluated at optimal eﬀort as a function of arousal for
the same values of R as in 4D and 4E, respectively. In 3F, anxiety reaches its
maximum for some level of arousal between 2 and 4. In 3G, the information cost
of full revelation is lower so the agent switches discontinuously to the threshold,
eﬀectively “cutting oﬀ” the region of maximum anxiety in 3F. As arousal increases
further, non-fully-revealing eﬀort levels become more informative and eventually
the agent discontinuously reduces eﬀort below the threshold to conserve on the
information cost.
We now compare our results with the cusp catastrophe model. Recall that in
the latter the relationship between performance and arousal is an inverted-U when
cognitive anxiety is low, but discontinuous when cognitive anxiety is high. Our
results in 4D and 4E are similar, except that our discontinuity does not involve
hysteresis. However, in the cusp catastrophe model performance is increasing in
cognitive anxiety when arousal is low, and decreasing when arousal is high. In
contrast, the inverted-U hypothesis generally obtains in our model, as in 4F and 4G.
Overall, our model generates a wider variety of anxiety-performance relationships.
22Some theories stress the importance of idiosyncratic factors for the anxiety-
performance relationship. In particular, the crux of the IZOF hypothesis is that
the zone of optimal functioning varies across individuals and the goal of the applied
psychologist is to ﬁnd it. However, the IZOF hypothesis itself cannot be used for
that purpose, since it contains no idiosyncratic parameters. Another example is
the butterﬂy catastrophe model in Hardy (1990), where self-conﬁdence is a “bias
factor” aﬀecting the anxiety-performance relationship. Zaichkowsky and Baltzell
(p. 331-333) discuss other potentially relevant factors, including:
It is also assumed that optimal arousal is dependent on the skill level of the
performer. This view comes largely from observations indicating that novice or
low-skilled athletes perform poorly under pressure conditions when arousal is high,
whereas experienced or highly skilled athletes tend to excel with pressure is highest
(and arousal is modest).
ibid, p. 332.
In Figure 5, we plot optimal eﬀort as a function of ¯ θ and a when R = 1.34.
Figure 5 Goes Here
We observe that when ex ante expected skill is low, eﬀort and performance are
largely decreasing in arousal, but when ¯ θ is high, maximum eﬀort and performance
occur for medium values of arousal. This agrees with the above passage, provided
we interpret “pressure” as high cognitive anxiety. Furthermore, the length of the
IZOF is increasing in ¯ θ. Hence, high-skilled agents require lower levels of arousal
to discontinuously jump to the threshold and can withstand higher levels of arousal
before discontinuously cutting eﬀort.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that the ELBD model captures several major themes
from the anxiety literature in psychology. As in the processing eﬃciency theory,
anxiety can serve a motivating function and changes in the components of anxiety
23can have positive or negative “aﬀect” as in reversal theory. The combination of these
two forces can make anxiety hill-shaped in its components, leading to an inverted-
U relationship with respect to eﬀort and expected performance. Furthermore, the
IZOF hypothesis obtains when ex ante expected skill and/or cognitive anxiety are
relatively high. Finally, the relationship between ex ante expected skill and the
IZOF is broadly consistent with hypotheses and anecdotal evidence in the sports
psychology literature.
Since anxiety can be manipulated and is partly determined by the institutional
environment, our theory should have applications in the principal-agent literature
and speciﬁcally to organizational management and design. E.g., consider the an-
nual performance review process common to many organizations. As Milgrom and
Roberts (1992) point out,
Most employees end up being evaluated highly, and so the rankings carry little
useful information. The problem is that the individual managers bear the (personal)
costs of assigning low ratings, and it is diﬃcult to compensate them for these costs.
In fact, to the extent that the system by which the managers are evaluated rewards
employee development, the managers may in eﬀect bear extra costs when they grade
employees as poor performers.
(p. 370).
Furthermore, if managers made ﬁne distinctions among employees, the latter would
have an incentive to attempt to politically inﬂuence the process, with all the at-
tending opportunity costs (inﬂuence costs). But this raises the question: given that
performance reviews are costly and generate little useful information, why are they
used? According to our model, there may be an optimal level of cognitive anxiety
and the mere prospect of an annual performance review may generate enough con-
cern on the employee’s part to provide a motivating function. Reducing the risk
associated with the evaluations ensures that cognitive anxiety is not too high, which
could adversely impact performance.
In the broader principal-agent literature, proposition 13 in Grossman and Hart
(1983) [coined the informativeness principle by Milgrom and Roberts (1992)] states
that the principal should never condition on uninformative noise because it only
24increases the agent’s risk premium. However, this result relies crucially on the
assumption of no wealth eﬀects and the principal may prefer a stochastic incen-
tive mechanism otherwise. According to our theory, an increase in pure noise (an
increase in a) can serve a motivating function, so the principal may want to manip-
ulate it. This clearly has implications for the monitoring intensity principle (ibid,
p. 226), where monitoring is modeled as a costly activity which reduces noise.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma
Assume 0 < e1 < 2/R and f is type 1. One can visualize the proof using Figure 1
above. By symmetry,
f(¯ θe1 − θLe1) = f(Re1/2) = f(−Re1/2) = f(¯ θe1 − θHe1), (A1)
so fL and fH cross at ¯ θe1. Since fL is decreasing on (θLe1, ¯ θe1] and fH is increasing
on [¯ θe1,θHe1), this crossing point is unique, and the rest follows. The type 2 case
is similar.
Proof of Proposition 1
We ﬁrst check that the proposition holds when e1 = 0 and e1 = 2/R. In the former
case, ρ = 1/2 for −1 < π1 < 1 so E(V2 |I1) = (1/2)¯ θ2 −(1/8)R2 from (8) and (10),
which agrees with (13) and (14). If e1 = 2/R then the signal π1 reveals the state
with probability 1 at the start of the second period. With probability 1/2: θ = θH,
e2 = θH, and V2 = (1/2)θ2
H. Also with probability 1/2: θ = θL, e2 = θL, and
V2 = (1/2)θ2
L. Using (6),
E(V2 |I1) = (1/4)(θ2
H + θ2
L) = (1/2)¯ θ2 + (1/8)R2, (A2)
which agrees with (13) and (14).
25Now assume 0 < e1 < 2/R. We ﬁrst re-write (10) as
E(V2 |I1) = (1/2)
Z H2
L1
V2 (fH + fL)dπ1. (A3)
We now work with the integrand in (A3).













































































































1ρ<1/2 fL dπ1. (A6)
Assume f is type 1. By the lemma, ρ ≥ 1/2 on [¯ θe1,H2) and ρ < 1/2 on
(L1, ¯ θe1). Hence,
Z H2
H1
1ρ≥1/2 fH dπ1 = 1 − F(¯ θe1 − θHe1) = 1 − F(−Re1/2)
26Z L2
L1
1ρ≥1/2 fL dπ1 = 1 − F(¯ θe1 − θLe1) = 1 − F(Re1/2)
Z H2
H1
1ρ<1/2 fH dπ1 = F(¯ θe1 − θHe1) = F(−Re1/2)
Z L2
L1
1ρ<1/2 fL dπ1 = F(¯ θe1 − θLe1) = F(Re1/2). (A7)
By symmetry,
F(Re1/2) = 1 − F(−Re1/2). (A8)
Substituting into (A6) and simplifying ﬁnishes the type 1 case.
Now assume f is type 2. By the lemma, ρ ≥ 1/2 on [H1, ¯ θe1] and (L2,H2) and
ρ < 1/2 on (L1,H1) and (¯ θe1,L2]. Hence,
Z H2
H1
1ρ≥1/2 fH dπ1 = F(¯ θe1 − θHe1) + 1 − F(L2 − θHe1)
= F(−Re1/2) + 1 − F(1 − Re1)
Z L2
L1
1ρ≥1/2 fL dπ1 = F(¯ θe1 − θLe1) − F(H1 − θLe1)
= F(Re1/2) − F(Re1 − 1)
Z H2
H1
1ρ<1/2 fH dπ1 = F(L2 − θHe1) − F(¯ θe1 − θHe1)
= F(1 − Re1) − F(−Re1/2)
Z L2
L1
1ρ<1/2 fL dπ1 = 1 − F(¯ θe1 − θLe1) + F(H1 − θLe1)
= 1 − F(Re1/2) + F(Re1 − 1). (A9)
By symmetry,
F(1 − Re1) = 1 − F(Re1 − 1). (A10)
Using the other symmetry relationship (A8), substituting into (A6), and simplifying
ﬁnishes the type 2 case.
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) is clear by inspection. To prove (ii), we calculate
∂A/∂R = −(R2/2)f(Re1/2)(e1/2) + R[1 − F(Re1/2)]. (A11)
27This can be re-written as
(1/R)(∂A/∂R) = −(1/2)f(x)x + [1 − F(x)], (A12)


























This is clear if f(1) > 0 and follows by L’Hospital’s Rule otherwise. Since (1−F)/f
is continuous and decreasing, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 4




































1/2 > 0 (the myopic optimum strictly dominates zero eﬀort) and f is type
1, the denominator is positive. Hence, the sign equals the sign of the numerator










where 0 < x < 1. Since f is type 1, f0(0)/f(0) = 0 and the expression in (A18)
blows up as x → 0. By assumption limx→1 f0(x)/f(x) < −3, so (A18) becomes
28negative as x → 1. Since the expression in (A18) is continuous and decreasing, the
result follows.
Proof of Proposition 6
The case −1 ≤ a < 0 has already been considered. When a = 0 (uniform distribu-
tion),
A(e1 |R) = (R2/8)(2 − Re1), (A19)











The sign of this depends on the behavior of
−7ay2 + 16ay − 4(1 + 2a), (A21)
where y = Re1. The maximizer for (A21) is y = 8/7, and its maximum is nonposi-












Since the expression in (A21) is quadratic, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 7






32(3 + a)2 , (A23)
whose sign depends on 4−R2e2
1 which is positive when eﬀort is non-fully-revealing.





32(3 + a)2(−20 + 24Re1 − 7R2e2
1). (A24)
The sign of (A24) depends on −20 + 24y − 7y2, which is negative for 0 ≤ y < 10/7
and positive for 10/7 < y < 2.
29Proof of Proposition 8
Note that assumptions 2(iii) only holds on a subinterval of [−1,0] so we must prove






(48 + 16a − 36Re1 − 5aR3e3
1), (A25)
so we investigate the behavior of
p1(y) = 48 − 36y + a(16 − 5y3), (A26)
where y ≡ Re1 and 0 < y < 2. We have p1(0) = 16a+48 > 0, p1(2) = −24(1+a) ≤
0, and p1 is decreasing from y = 0 to the critical point y =
p
−12/5a, after which
it is increasing. When −1 ≤ a < −3/5,
p
−12/5a < 2 and p1(2) ≤ 0. When
−3/5 ≤ a < 0,
p
−12/5a ≥ 2, and the result follows. The case a = 0 is easily













p2(y) = 48 − 36y + a(16 − 72y + 96y2 − 35y3). (A28)
Once again, we have p2(0) = 48 + 16a > 0 and p2(2) = −24(1 + a) < 0. Now, if p2
has one real root, then A will be hill-shaped in R. If it has three between 0 and 2, it
will consist of two successive hills joined together. (If there are two, the transition
point is an inﬂection point.) Since p2 has the usual sideways-S shape, it will have
three real roots iﬀ there exists a negative local minimum, so that two of the roots






Substituting this into p2, after a fair amount of algebra we get
p3(a) =(528/35) + (48/35)
p
46 − (105/a) + (4496/1225)a−
(736/1225)a
p
46 − (105/a). (A30)
30Letting z2 = 46 − (105/a), the above is equivalent to
p4(z) = (37776/35) − (528/35)z2 − (48/35)z3. (A31)
Clearly, p4 has a unique positive zero ¯ z ≈ 6.67. Furthermore, p4 > 0 for all 0 ≤
z < ¯ z and p4 < 0 for all ¯ z < z. Hence, there exists a unique ¯ a > 0 such that
¯ z2 = 46 − (105/¯ a), and which serves the same role for p3.
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33Figure 1.  Separating the conditional densities in the type 1 case.
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anxiety Panel BFigure 4









































































Effort Panel BFigure 5
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